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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.  
 
Alan Schmidt, a former shareholder in the now-
defunct Genaera Corporation (“Genaera”), appeals from the 
District Court order dismissing his complaint on statute of 
limitations grounds. Genaera was a biotechnology company 
that dissolved in June 2009 and liquidated its assets. On June 
8, 2012, Schmidt brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of 
himself and all other former Genaera shareholders against the 
liquidating trustee (Argyce, LLC (“Argyce”)); the Genaera 
Liquidating Trust; John Skolas, who served as Argyce’s CEO 
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and Genaera’s former CFO; former major Genaera 
shareholders Xmark Capital Partners, LLC (“Xmark”) and 
Biotechnology Value Fund, Inc. (“BVF”); former directors 
and officers of Genaera (“D&O defendants”); and the 
purchasers of certain Genaera assets.  The essence of 
Schmidt’s complaint is that the liquidating trustee and the 
D&O defendants breached their fiduciary duties by disposing 
of promising drug technologies in tainted insider deals for far 
less than their true value.  He also alleges that Xmark and 
BVF, Genaera’s two largest shareholders, aided and abetted 
this behavior so that companies they controlled could acquire 
Genaera’s assets at fire sale prices.  All defendants except for 
SCO Financial Group (“SCO”) moved to dismiss Schmidt’s 
complaint as untimely under the applicable two-year statute 
of limitations. 
 
Schmidt did not dispute the applicability of the two-
year statute of limitations and acknowledged that he filed suit 
more than two years after the relevant assets were sold.  
Instead, he argued that the statute of limitations should be 
tolled under Pennsylvania’s discovery rule because he could 
not have been aware of the insider nature of the sales or that 
the assets were sold for far below their actual value until he 
learned the details of the sales, and certain subsequent market 
events suggested to him that the assets were quite valuable.  
The District Court rejected this argument and held that 
Schmidt had all the information he needed to file the suit 
more than two years before he filed.  Schmidt timely 
appeals.1 
 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a).  This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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                                   I.  
 
 Genaera was a biotechnology company that developed 
pharmaceutical drugs and held licenses to patents and other 
intellectual property.  In April 2009, Genaera’s board of 
directors concluded that the company’s prospects were dim, 
and announced their intent to dissolve the company.  On April 
18, 2009, the board unanimously approved, and 
recommended that the shareholders approve, a plan of 
dissolution to dispose of the company’s assets through a 
liquidating trust.  On May 14, 2009, the board submitted a 
proxy statement to shareholders regarding the dissolution plan 
and filed that proxy statement with the SEC.  The proxy 
statement warned shareholders that they should expect to 
receive only 1/5 of a penny to 1.7 cents per share once the 
assets were liquidated.  The complaint alleges that the proxy 
statement contained misrepresentations about whether any 
Genaera officers or directors would profit from the 
dissolution, and that it was flawed in various ways.  The 
shareholders approved the dissolution plan on June 4, 2009, 
and Genaera filed articles of dissolution with the Delaware 
Secretary of State on June 12, 2009.  Pursuant to the 
dissolution plan, the company’s assets were transferred to the 
Genaera Liquidating Trust, with defendant Argyce as 
liquidating trustee.   
 
 Three of Genaera’s assets that were ultimately sold, 
with the proceeds being distributed to shareholders, are 
relevant to this appeal.  The allegations related to each of 
those assets are discussed in turn.   
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A.  The Aminosterol Assets 
 
 The Aminosterol Assets consisted of compounds used 
for treating macular degeneration.  The trustee sold the 
Aminosterol Assets in May 2009 for $200,000 to BBM 
Holdings, Inc. (“BBM”), the predecessor to defendant Ohr 
Pharmaceuticals (“Ohr”).  The complaint states that in August 
2009, “the Trustee publicly reported that the Aminosterol 
Assets inventory had been sold for a nominal sum.”  App. at 
106a.  It is not clear from the complaint whether the trustee’s 
announcement named the purchaser or the sale price.  Ohr 
filed a Form 8-K in August 2009 announcing the purchase, 
with the purchase agreement (including the sale price) 
attached.   
 
 The complaint avers that the purchaser, BBM, is a 
shell company that arranged financing for the purchase before 
Genaera’s shareholders even formally voted to dissolve the 
company.  The complaint further alleges that Argyce and 
Skolas breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing 
prematurely to this offer instead of marketing the assets 
properly.  The complaint also asserts that the Aminosterol 
Assets were worth far more than the $200,000 sale price, 
citing a May 2012 presentation in which defendant Ohr, the 
successor to BBM, estimated the potential market for drugs 
based on the compounds at 1.75 million U.S. patients.  
  
B.  Pexiganan 
 
 Pexiganan was a topical cream for the treatment of 
diabetic foot infections.  MacroChem Corp. (“MacroChem”) 
licensed the right to develop Pexiganan from Genaera in 
2007.  Under the terms of the license, Genaera would receive 
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payments totaling $7 million upon the achievement of certain 
development milestones, up to $35 million for reaching 
certain sales milestones, and 10% of sales as royalties.  The 
complaint alleges that at some point in 2008, “MacroChem 
abruptly reversed course on Pexiganan,” App. at 86a, 
spending only $45,110 on development of Pexiganan that 
year.  Defendant Access Pharmaceuticals acquired 
MacroChem in 2009, and ceased development of Pexiganan.  
The complaint alleges that Genaera had a right under its 
agreement with MacroChem to demand the return of 
Pexiganan if MacroChem ceased development, but the D&O 
defendants, in breach of their fiduciary duties, failed to 
exercise that right.  Pexiganan was ultimately returned to 
Genaera Liquidating Trust in December 2009, after Genaera’s 
dissolution.  The complaint implies that demanding the return 
of Pexiganan earlier and continuing its development could 
have staved off the need to dissolve Genaera.   
 
 The complaint further alleges that the liquidating 
trustee ultimately sold Pexiganan in an improper, self-dealing 
transaction.  Specifically, certain insiders from MacroChem 
founded a new company, Dipexium, which bid on Pexiganan 
in liquidation.  The liquidating trustee set a short deadline for 
bidding, announcing the availability of Pexiganan on January 
11, 2010, and setting a deadline of February 12, 2010, for 
bids.  The complaint alleges that this short deadline favored 
the MacroChem insiders associated with Dipexium because 
they were already familiar with Pexiganan.  Meanwhile, 
outside bidders had to await receipt of a “confidential 
information package,” review it, and perform 
pharmacological, regulatory, and valuation analyses, all in 
just one month before submitting their bids.  Although 
Pexiganan’s sales potential for Genaera was allegedly 
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estimated to exceed $100 million, Dipexium ultimately 
acquired the rights to Pexiganan for a “minor purchase price” 
and free of any royalty and milestone payment obligations.  
The complaint does not contain the exact date of the sale.  
And, Schmidt contends that the earliest he could have known 
of Pexiganan’s sale price was 2011, when Argyce publicly 
issued unaudited financial statements for the year ended 
December 31, 2010, which, according to the complaint, 
evidences that Pexiganan was sold for approximately 
$252,000.  The complaint alleges that about ninety days after 
buying the rights to Pexiganan, Dipexium raised $1.07 
million in funding to develop the asset, and raised another 
$1.4 million ninety days after that. 
 
C.  Interlukin 9 (“IL9”) 
 
 IL9 was an antibody program for asthma.  Genaera had 
licensed the technology to MedImmune, LLC 
(“MedImmune”).  Under its agreement with MedImmune, 
Genaera could have received up to $54 million in payments 
and royalties if IL9 reached certain development milestones.  
The complaint alleges that defendant Skolas had previously 
told Schmidt that IL9 had the potential for “$3 to $4 billion 
peak year sales.”  App. at 99a.   
 
 On May 18, 2010, the liquidating trustee sold IL9 for 
“a mere” $2.75 million to defendant Ligand Pharmaceuticals 
(“Ligand”).  Two days later, Ligand conveyed half of that 
interest to defendant BVF—one of Genaera’s largest 
shareholders.  Ligand filed the IL9 purchase agreement with 
the SEC on May 24, 2010, as an attachment to a Form 8-K.  
The purchase agreement disclosed the price and the 
subsequent sale to BVF.  
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The complaint alleges that the sale to Ligand for a “de 
minimis” price was a fraudulent transaction intended to allow 
BVF to acquire the asset at a price below its value.  The 
complaint points to the fact that prior to the liquidation, BVF 
was both Genaera’s second-largest shareholder and also 
owned 15% of Ligand’s stock.  However, in the period before 
Genaera’s dissolution, BVF sold Ligand stock until it held 
less than a 10% share, and thus would no longer be 
considered a Ligand insider.  BVF’s reduction in its 
ownership of Ligand, the complaint alleges, was a 
smokescreen to disguise the fact that the sale of IL9 to 
Ligand, which subsequently conveyed it to BVF, was actually 
a preferential sale to a major Genaera shareholder.  Finally, 
the complaint alleges that the net effect of this transfer was to 
take a valuable asset that would have benefited all of 
Genaera’s shareholders and transfer it to a single major 
shareholder.   
 
                                     II. 
 
 Schmidt brought suit against the liquidating trustee, 
the liquidating trust, John Skolas, former officers and 
directors of Genaera, BVF, Ligand, Xmark, Ohr, Dipexium, 
MacroChem, Access, and SCO.  The complaint contained 
twelve counts.  Those relevant to this appeal are: 
 
1. Count 1:  breach of fiduciary duty by the D&O 
defendants; 
2. Count 2:  breach of the duties of a trustee by the 
liquidating trustee; 
3. Count 3:  waste of corporate assets by the D&O 
defendants; 
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4. Count 9:  breach of fiduciary duties owed by 
controlling shareholders to minority shareholders by 
defendants Xmark, Kaye and BVF; 
5. Count 10:  punitive damages; 
6. Count 11:  rescission of the sale of the Aminosterol 
Assets to Ohr; and 
7. Count 12:  rescission of the sale of Pexiganan to 
Dipexium. 
 
Several of those counts also charge other defendants with 
aiding and abetting.  All of the defendants except SCO moved 
to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.  Schmidt agreed 
to dismiss counts 4-8 without prejudice before the District 
Court rendered its decision. 
 
 The District Court dismissed all counts of the 
complaint with prejudice.  In relevant part, it held that 
Schmidt filed the breach of fiduciary duty and corporate 
waste claims after the applicable two-year statute of 
limitations had expired, and that the discovery rule did not 
save the claims.  Specifically, the District Court held that 
Schmidt had “not met his burden of demonstrating that the 
discovery rule should apply here.”  App. at 28a.  In doing so, 
the District Court noted that “by May 2010, all of the relevant 
transactions had occurred and been publicly announced, 
through a combination of updates from [Genaera Liquidating 
Trust], public SEC filings, and press releases from the 
acquiring companies.”  Id. at 27a.  It dismissed the rescission 
and punitive damages claims because they cannot stand 
without their underlying claims, and dismissed counts 4-8 
with prejudice, even though Schmidt had previously agreed to 
dismiss those claims without prejudice. 
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 The District Court’s decision did not cite, and the 
parties did not call to its attention, this court’s opinion in In re 
Mushroom Transportation Co., 382 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 
2004), which bears on this appeal because it provides 
standards for applying the discovery rule in cases involving 
the statute of limitations applicable to fiduciary defendants. 
 
 Schmidt timely appeals.  While he concedes that a 
two-year statute of limitations applies and acknowledges that 
the relevant transactions occurred more than two years before 
he filed his suit, he argues that the District Court erred in 
considering materials outside of the complaint in evaluating 
the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and that material factual 
disputes exist as to whether Pennsylvania’s discovery rule 
tolled the limitations period. 
 
III. 
 
We review a District Court’s dismissal of a complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo.  
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint 
need not anticipate or overcome affirmative defenses; thus, a 
complaint does not fail to state a claim simply because it 
omits facts that would defeat a statute of limitations defense.  
See In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (citing Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (“[L]itigants need not try to plead around 
defenses”)). 
 
 Schmidt argues that the District Court erred in two 
ways:  first, by considering documents not appropriate for 
consideration at the motion to dismiss stage, and second, by 
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holding that the discovery rule did not apply to toll 
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.  We address each of 
Schmidt’s arguments in turn.  
 
                                            A. 
 
The District Court erred in considering certain 
documents attached to defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  
Technically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a 
defendant to plead an affirmative defense, like a statute of 
limitations defense, in the answer, not in a motion to dismiss.  
See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 
2002).  In this circuit, however, we permit a limitations 
defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “only if 
‘the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the 
cause of action has not been brought within the statute of 
limitations.’”  Id. (quoting Hanna v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin. 
Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975)).  However, “‘[i]f 
the bar is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it 
may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6).’”  Id. (quoting Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. 
Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 
“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally 
consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public 
record.”  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. 
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); see also 
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“However, an exception to the general rule is that a 
‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the 
complaint’ may be considered ‘without converting the motion 
to dismiss into one for summary judgment.’”  In re 
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Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 
1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996), superseded on other grounds by 
PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).  “The rationale underlying 
this exception is that the primary problem raised by looking 
to documents outside the complaint—lack of notice to the 
plaintiff—is dissipated ‘[w]here the plaintiff has actual notice 
. . . and has relied upon these documents in framing the 
complaint.”  Id. (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 
(1st Cir. 1993)).  “[W]hat is critical is whether the claims in 
the complaint are ‘based’ on an extrinsic document and not 
merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited.”  
Id.    
 
The defendants in this case attached several different 
kinds of documents to their motions to dismiss.  Some, like 
the affidavits attached by the Dipexium defendants, clearly 
may not be considered at this stage.  See Cent. Contracting 
Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary 
judgment where the parties submitted affidavits in support of 
their positions).  Others, like the SEC filings attached by a 
number of the defendants, are matters of public record of 
which the court can take judicial notice.  See City of 
Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 
1998); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 
1197 (explaining that “public record[s]” in this context are 
materials like decision letters of government agencies and 
published reports of administrative bodies). 
 
The District Court relied not just on the complaint and 
SEC filings, but also on “updates from [Genaera Liquidating 
Trust] . . . and press releases from the acquiring companies” 
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that the defendants attached to their motions to dismiss.  App. 
at 27a.  The defendants argue that these materials, available 
before June 8, 2010, contain all the information Schmidt 
needed to ascertain his injury.  While that may be true, these 
materials may not be considered at the motion to dismiss 
stage.  They are not integral to the complaint—the complaint 
was not “based” on press releases or updates from Genaera 
Liquidation Trust, but rather on sales transactions.  See In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426.  Nor 
are those documents the records of a government agency.  See 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1197.   
 
Moreover, taking notice of these postings on Genaera 
Liquidating Trust’s website and the press releases is 
inconsistent with the rationale of the integral documents 
exception.  As this court explained in In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Securities Litigation, the justification for the integral 
documents exception is that it is not unfair to hold a plaintiff 
accountable for the contents of documents it must have used 
in framing its complaint, nor should a plaintiff be able to 
evade accountability for such documents simply by not 
attaching them to his complaint.  See 114 F.3d at 1426.  But 
Schmidt claims that he never saw the updates on the Genaera 
Liquidating Trust website and disputes that they were 
publicly posted on the dates that the defendants claim that 
they were posted.  He asserts that the document on which he 
based his complaint is Genaera Liquidating Trust’s financial 
information for fiscal year 2010, which was disclosed 
sometime in 2011 in a report by the liquidating trustee.  
Therefore, the District Court’s reliance on press releases and 
updates from Genaera Liquidating Trust was improper. 
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                                      B. 
 
We now turn to whether, based only on the documents 
properly considered at the motion to dismiss stage (the 
complaint, the SEC filings, and certain “integral documents” 
such as the fiscal report on which Schmidt relied), Schmidt’s 
claims should have been dismissed on statute of limitations 
grounds. 
 
The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania’s two-
year statute of limitations for claims of breach of fiduciary 
duty and corporate waste applies.  “The general rule is that 
the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as a right to 
institute and maintain suit arises.”  Haugh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
322 F.3d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Crouse v. Cyclops 
Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000)). 
 
 Looking only to the dates alleged in the complaint, it 
is clear that Schmidt’s right to assert claims related to the 
Aminosterol Assets and IL9 arose before June 8, 2010.  The 
sale of the Aminosterol Assets occurred at the latest by June 
8, 2009, when the trustee accepted a $50,000 down payment 
for the assets.  The sale of IL9 to Ligand occurred on May 18, 
2010.  All of the conduct by BVF that was allegedly intended 
to cover up the self-dealing nature of the IL9 sale occurred in 
2008 and 2009.  These dates are all contained in Schmidt’s 
complaint, and are before June 8, 2010.  Unless the discovery 
rule tolls the statute of limitations, an issue which is discussed 
infra, these claims are time-barred. 
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In contrast, the claims arising from the Pexiganan sale 
are not facially time-barred, even without reliance on the 
discovery rule.  The complaint states that the liquidating 
trustee solicited bids for the sale of the Pexiganan Assets on 
January 11, 2010, and set a February 12, 2010 deadline for 
bids.  However, there is no precise sale date, and the 
complaint vaguely references that the sale took place in 2010.  
David Luci of Dipexium submitted an affidavit averring that 
Dipexium purchased Pexiganan on April 8, 2010.  But an 
affidavit from a defendant may not be considered in deciding 
a motion to dismiss.  See Cent. Contracting Co., 367 F.2d at 
343.  There is no document in the record that might properly 
be considered on a motion to dismiss, such as an asset 
purchase agreement, that establishes that the sale of 
Pexiganan occurred before June 8, 2010.  Therefore, 
Schmidt’s claims arising out of this sale are not time-barred 
even without considering the discovery rule. 
 
                                                C. 
 
“The discovery rule is a judicially created device 
which tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations 
until the point where the complaining party knows or 
reasonably should know that he has been injured and that his 
injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.”  Crouse, 
745 A.2d at 611.  “In order to determine when the statute 
should begin to run, the finder of fact focuses on whether the 
plaintiff was reasonably diligent in discovering his injury.”  
Id.  “Pursuant to application of the discovery rule, the point at 
which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that 
he has suffered an injury is a factual issue ‘best determined by 
the collective judgment, wisdom and experience of jurors.’”  
Id. (quoting White v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Corp., 668 
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A.2d 136, 144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)).  “[O]nly where the facts 
are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the 
commencement of the limitations period be determined as a 
matter of law.”  Id. 
 
Generally, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing 
that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations.  See 
Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. 1997).  
However, while a court may entertain a motion to dismiss on 
statute of limitations grounds, Robinson, 313 F.3d at 135, it 
may not allocate the burden of invoking the discovery rule in 
a way that is inconsistent with the rule that a plaintiff is not 
required to plead, in a complaint, facts sufficient to overcome 
an affirmative defense.  See In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
381 F.3d at 277 (citing Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[L]itigants need not try to plead around 
defenses”)); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 
38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).  This distinction 
comes to the fore here, where the applicability of the 
discovery rule is not evident on the face of the complaint but 
the plaintiff also does not plead facts that unequivocally show 
that the discovery rule does not apply. 
 
This court has stated, in the context of the discovery 
rule, that when “the pleading does not reveal when the 
limitations period began to run . . . the statute of limitations 
cannot justify Rule 12 dismissal.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. 
Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011).  Several of our 
sister circuits have held the same.  See USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery 
Dennison Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]hen reviewing a trial court’s dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [an appellate court is] 
required to accept all well-pleaded facts as true” and cannot 
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dismiss a complaint unless it can “definitively say that the 
discovery rule . . . [does] not apply.” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)), vacated on other grounds, 133 
S. Ct. 1794 (2013); Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 
n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that dismissal may be appropriate 
when “the plaintiff effectively pleads herself out of court by 
alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense”); 
Jones v. Rogers Mem. Hosp., 442 F.2d 773, 775 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (holding that the “statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), and need not be negatived by 
the language of the complaint”). 
 
The District Court appears to have relied on the non-
precedential opinion in Brawner v. Education Management 
Corp., 513 F. App’x 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  In that 
case, this court dismissed a complaint in which a former 
student sued the Art Institute of Philadelphia based on his 
unsatisfactory experience.  Id. at 149-50.  He brought suit in 
2011, but had attended the school in the late 1990s, and his 
last dealing with the school was in 2005.  Id. at 150-51.  This 
court determined that “no reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that [the plaintiff] filed within the limitations 
period.”  Id. at 150.  However, our conclusion was based on 
the plaintiff’s “complaint and other filings” which showed 
that “he knew he was injured and made repeated inquiries of 
the various defendants.”  Id. at 151.  In other words, the 
Brawner plaintiff “effectively [pleaded himself] out of court 
by alleging facts that [were] sufficient to establish the 
defense.”  See Hollander, 457 F.3d at 691 n.1. 
 
In this case, Schmidt has not pleaded himself out of 
court.  As discussed in further detail below, nothing in 
Schmidt’s complaint clearly suggests that he did in fact have 
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knowledge of the full scope of his injury prior to June 8, 
2010.  Instead, the District Court dismissed Schmidt’s 
complaint for failing to affirmatively show that he exercised 
“reasonable diligence” with respect to discovering his injury.  
Requiring Schmidt to make a showing of reasonable diligence 
was premature.  The District Court effectively required 
Schmidt to plead around an affirmative defense in his 
complaint, which is inconsistent with Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) 
and with this court’s decision in Barefoot Architect. 
 
Under a de novo review, applying the proper standards 
as discussed supra, we conclude that it is not evident on the 
face of the complaint and documents properly considered at 
the motion to dismiss stage whether the discovery rule saves 
Schmidt’s claims.  Because Schmidt limits his appeal to the 
claims involving the allegedly improper sales of the 
Aminosterol Assets, IL9, and Pexiganan, we only need to 
consider the facts pertaining to these transactions. 
 
As to the Aminosterol Assets, Ohr’s August 2009 SEC 
filing establishes that the Aminosterol Assets were sold on 
August 21, 2009, for $200,000.  Thus, Schmidt’s claims 
arising out of this transaction are untimely unless the 
discovery rule applies.  It is not clear whether “reasonable 
diligence” should have required Schmidt to look at the SEC 
filings of a company that heretofore had nothing to do with 
Genaera.  There is no evidence within the complaint or other 
integral documents to show that Schmidt knew or should have 
known the identity of the buyer.  If he did know the identity, 
perhaps a court could find that “reasonable diligence” 
required him to seek out the buyer’s SEC filings to find the 
sale price of the assets.  However, there is no indication in the 
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pleadings or integral documents that Schmidt had this 
information. 
 
 As to the IL9 Assets, Ligand’s SEC filing dated May 
18, 2010, establishes that Ligand purchased the IL9 Assets on 
May 18, 2010 for $2.75 million, and Ligand conveyed a 50% 
interest to BVF on May 20, 2010 for $1.375 million.  As 
discussed, supra, these dates are before June 8, 2010, and 
Schmidt’s claims as to them are untimely unless the discovery 
rule applies.  As with the Aminosterol Assets, it is unclear 
whether “reasonable diligence” requires Schmidt to seek out 
the SEC filings of a company previously unassociated with 
Genaera.  Again, the crucial missing link is any evidence in 
the record showing that Schmidt knew or should have known 
of the identity of the buyer.  If he had known the buyer’s 
identity, he might reasonably be charged with looking at the 
buyer’s SEC filings to determine the purchase price of the 
assets and the fact of the allegedly fraudulent circumstances 
surrounding the sale, such as BVF’s reduction of its Ligand 
ownership and its immediate acquisition of a 50% interest in 
IL9.  However, it is impossible to tell based on the documents 
properly considered at this stage how much Schmidt knew, 
and when. 
 
As to the Pexiganan Assets, the date of sale cannot be 
determined on the basis of any document that we may 
consider that may have been available to Schmidt before June 
8, 2010.  Thus, dismissal of Schmidt’s claims with respect to 
the Pexiganan sale was not appropriate at the motion to 
dismiss stage. 
 
 Moreover, the existence of the fiduciary relationship 
between Schmidt, as a former shareholder, and several of the 
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defendants weighs in favor of finding that the discovery rule 
tolls the limitations period for all three of the assets at issue.  
“[T]he existence of a fiduciary relationship is relevant to a 
discovery rule analysis precisely because it entails such a 
presumptive level of trust in the fiduciary by the principal that 
it may take a ‘smoking gun’ to excite searching inquiry on the 
principal’s part into its fiduciary’s behavior.”  In re 
Mushroom Transp. Co., 382 F.3d at 343 (applying 
Pennsylvania’s discovery rule).  The District Court held 
Schmidt to a standard of “reasonable diligence” in 
determining that Schmidt should have known of his injuries 
by June 8, 2010.  However, the concept of “reasonable 
diligence” in the fiduciary context is more deferential to 
plaintiffs, and acknowledges that it might take a “smoking 
gun” for a plaintiff to be on notice of a fiduciary’s 
wrongdoing.  There is nothing in the limited record we may 
consider at this stage that amounts to the sort of “smoking 
gun” that would trigger Schmidt’s diligence obligations. 
 
 In summary, it was premature for the District Court to 
dismiss Schmidt’s complaint on statute of limitations grounds 
at this early stage of the litigation.  Because Schmidt’s 
allegations do not facially show that his claims as to 
Aminosterol, IL9, and Pexiganan are time-barred, their 
dismissal by the District Court must be reversed. 
 
                                                D. 
 
 The defendants offer a host of alternative bases for 
affirming dismissal, and urge this court to affirm on those 
bases.  It is premature to consider those arguments, which the 
District Court did not reach and Schmidt did not brief on 
appeal.   
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                                               IV. 
 The claims arising out of the sales of the Aminosterol 
Assets, IL9, and Pexiganan cannot be considered time-barred 
at this stage.  We will reverse the portion of the District 
Court’s order dismissing these claims.  Because the District 
Court’s dismissal of the rescission and punitive damages 
claims was based on its statute of limitations ruling, we will 
also reverse the decision as to those claims.  Finally, because 
the District Court dismissed counts 4-8 with prejudice based 
on its statute of limitations ruling, we will also reverse the 
dismissal with prejudice of those counts.  The remainder of 
the order will be affirmed.  
Schmidt v. Skolas 
No. 13-3750 
          
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 I see no reason to remand this case to the District 
Court and would affirm. As the Majority notes: “Schmidt did 
not dispute the applicability of the two-year statute of 
limitations and acknowledged that he filed suit more than two 
years after the relevant assets were sold.” (Maj. Op. 6.)1 
Schmidt’s main argument on appeal is that the District Court 
improperly considered matters outside the record regarding 
the events in question in dismissing his case. This is a 
diversionary tactic, and is incorrect.  
 
 The District Court’s reference to documents in its 
opinion that demonstrate that Schmidt’s concession was 
correct, i.e., that all the events in question did occur prior to 
the requisite two-year period, was not necessary to the 
dismissal. Once Schmidt conceded his tardiness, the sole 
relevant issue was whether the discovery rule would save 
him, and the District Court determined, based on Schmidt’s 
own assertions, that it would not. Schmidt’s protestations and 
Majority’s extensive narrative as to what the Amended 
Complaint revealed are, therefore, a red herring and beside 
the point.  
                                              
1 At oral argument before the District Court, Schmidt’s 
counsel acknowledged that “we missed the two-year period 
by a couple of weeks.” (App. 1576a.)  
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 The District Court’s ruling was based on the fact that 
Schmidt failed to assert why, with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, he could not have known of the injury, i.e., that the 
prices were too low, as the discovery rule requires. Dilworth 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 418 F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2005). The 
Majority makes passing reference to a weaker burden that 
Schmidt could actually satisfy, i.e., that he didn’t know the 
prices until later. But that is not the test or the burden. 
Schmidt has never come close to setting forth any facts as to 
why he, a very sophisticated investor, who kept himself aware 
of the value of these assets, could not have known, after the 
proxy statement revealed the dissolution plan in May 2009, 
that the sale prices – presumably available through some 
investigation – were inadequate.2  
 
                                              
2 In the Amended Complaint, Schmidt pled facts that actually 
undermined the applicability of the discovery rule. He stated 
that “[i]n 2009, Genaera had several valuable assets” 
including IL9, Pexiganan, and the Aminosterol Assets, and 
that “[t]hese were all valuable assets in which Genaera had 
invested large sums of money in their development over the 
previous decade.” (App. 67a-68a.) He also stated that he 
“throughout the years has held many conversations with 
Genaera officers and directors concerning the Core Assets, 
their value and the prospects for their commercial 
exploitation and/or monetization.” (App. 69a.) If he knew that 
the assets were so valuable and that they had been the subject 
of considerable investment over the previous decade, then 
surely he was on inquiry notice when he received the proxy 
statement indicating that Genaera was liquidating its shares 
for pennies on the dollar. 
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 Indeed, before the District Court at oral argument, 
Schmidt’s counsel conceded that Schmidt received notice in 
2010 of sales of certain assets previously owned by Genaera 
and that, for the next two years, “he was putting together all 
the facts and circumstances.” (App. 1583a.) Before our panel 
at oral argument, Schmidt’s counsel insisted that the 
discovery rule applies because he did not “learn” of the 
Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing until 2011. That argument is 
insufficient because “a plaintiff's subjective knowledge is 
insufficient to invoke the discovery rule.” Vitalo v. Cabot 
Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 543 (3d Cir. 2005). In other words, 
“[m]istake, misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge in 
themselves do not toll the running of the statute.” Fine v. 
Checcio, 582 Pa. 253, 266 (2005). At oral argument, despite 
repeated questions, Schmidt did not provide any indication of 
what, if anything, he did by way of diligence, or any reason 
why he could not have learned of the alleged wrongdoing 
earlier. 
 
 A plaintiff, faced with a clear “miss” of the statute of 
limitations, must come forth with some basis for invoking the 
discovery rule. See Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 511 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“the plaintiff attempting to apply the 
discovery rule bears the burden of demonstrating that he 
exercised reasonable diligence in determining the existence 
and cause of his injury.”). See also Hocker v. CitiMortgage, 
Inc., Civ. 09-973, 2012 WL 174967, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 
2012) (dismissing claims because “Plaintiff has failed to meet 
her burden of establishing equitable tolling because she has 
made no argument as to how she was reasonably diligent in 
investigating and bringing the instant claims . . . .”);  
Haagensen v. Pennsylvania State Police, Civ. 08-727, 2009 
WL 1437608, *6 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2009) (recommending 
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dismissal because “Plaintiff bears the burden of 
demonstrating that these exceptions [discovery rule or 
equitable tolling] to the statute of limitations apply.”).   
 
 As the District Court explained in its opinion, “to toll 
the statute of limitations on every plaintiff’s mere assertion 
that he needed time to put together all the facts and 
circumstances would eviscerate the very concept of a 
limitations period.” (Dist. Ct. Op. 12.) “Although the purpose 
of the ‘discovery rule’ is to mitigate in worthy cases the 
harshness of an absolute and rigid period of limitations, the 
rule cannot be applied so loosely as to nullify the purpose for 
which a statute of limitations exists.” Ingenito v. AC & S, 
Inc., 633 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). This is not a 
matter of consideration of matters outside the record; this is, 
instead, a matter of what a plaintiff who has failed to comply 
with the statute of limitations must do to satisfy the discovery 
rule.  
 
 Tellingly, Schmidt does not argue that there are facts 
he would have adduced if this matter had been treated, as he 
urges, as a motion for summary judgment.3 I suggest there are 
none, and remand is therefore unnecessary. I would affirm. 
                                              
3 I suggest that to tell District Court judges that, in deciding a 
motion to dismiss, they cannot take into account the 
concessions and candor of counsel at oral argument unless 
they first convert the motion to one for summary judgment is 
to exalt form over substance and waste judicial resources.  
